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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses objections against the aims of nudges–the objectives and legitimacy of nudges–
and the means of nudges–the type of influence of nudges. It explores some of the limitations of the main 
normative criticism in both dimensions and contends that there is nothing inherently wrong with nudges. 
The paper argues that normative conclusions about their use should discuss nudges ethical implications 
beyond libertarian paternalism, explore how different nudges affect behaviour and discuss their possible 
normative drawback surpassing ideal notions of rationality and decision-making.
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RESUMEN
El presente artículo discute críticas normativas al uso de nudges en política pública, considerando 
objeciones a sus objetivos y objeciones a su funcionamiento. El articulo explora las limitaciones de ambas 
objeciones y sostiene que no hay nada intrínsecamente problemático en el uso de nudges. El artículo 
argumenta que las conclusiones normativas sobre su uso deberían discutir sus implicaciones normativas 
más allá del paternalismo libertario, explorar cómo los diferentes nudges afectan el comportamiento y 
discutir sus implicaciones éticas superando nociones ideales de racionalidad y autonomía.
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INTRODUCTION
Nudges are interventions in the decision-making environment that steer individuals towards a particular 
direction without altering their economic incentives and without forbidding any options. Their implementation 
is based on evidence from behavioural economics that shows that decision-making is systematically affec-
ted by heuristics and cognitive biases; agents’ have non-consistent preferences that vary according to the 
context of choice, and their behaviour is sensitive to social influence (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Although 
their application is gaining increasing presence and importance in several domains, their use remains a con-
troversial topic.
Part of the debate regarding nudges deals with ethical concerns. In the discussion about their ethical ac-
ceptability, nudges have sparked accusations of covert paternalism, manipulation, lack of transparency, and 
overall concerns about having an undermining effect on individuals’ freedom of choice and autonomy (e.g. 
Bovens, 2009; Hausman and Welch, 2010; White, 2013). The ethical debate is so prominent that it seems to 
indicate that something is particularly wrong with nudges.
Initially, nudges were tied with libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). As a normative 
framework, libertarian paternalism prescribes that nudges should be used to promote specific values 
and ends. The paternalistic side of the approach aims to change individuals’ behaviour to ‘make choo-
sers better off, as judged by themselves’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). The libertarian side of the 
approach wants to do so without restricting the original set of choices, thereby respecting individuals’ 
freedom of choice. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) remark that these two aspects make nudges a legitimate 
policy intervention tool. While nudges are now being used beyond this framework, nudges proponents 
still argue that affecting choices through nudges is unproblematic because nudges steer people towards 
directions they agree with and do so while maintaining all the options and preserving individuals’ ability 
to opt-out of the nudge.
Despite nudges overall positive intention, it has become apparent in the discussion that these standards 
are unsatisfactory to support nudges moral acceptability. For the most part, critics find nudges problematic in 
many grounds and indicate that nudges fail to comply with the original normative standards and carry added 
normative costs.
Ethical objections to nudges are grounded in many arguments. While arguments are diverse, typically 
they can be classified as (a) arguments against the aims of nudges, and (b) arguments against the means of 
nudges. By “the means of nudges” I mean the ways in which they steer people’s choices. Objections to the 
aims of nudges emphasise the difficulties in identifying people’s preferences and reorganising individuals’ 
context according to what they want. Objections to the means of nudges usually present nudging as a mani-
pulative strategy that lacks transparency and undermines individuals’ autonomy. Although this literature has 
established essential points to remain vigilant about how nudges are used in public policy, further arguments 
need to be considered.
This paper explores some of the main normative objections regarding nudges by considering both nud-
ges’ objectives and how nudges work. The paper aims to map frequent objections on both dimensions and 
address their implications and limitations to draw normative conclusions about nudges. In what follows, it 
is argued that nudges are not intrinsically problematic, neither because of their aims nor because of their 
means. This paper suggests that normative considerations about nudges require discussing their ethical im-
plications beyond the libertarian paternalism framework, exploring how different nudges affect behaviour and 
surpassing ideal notions of decision-making and rationality.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 addresses the debate about the aims of nudges. It provides 
an overview of the main arguments against nudges and responds to the principal objections. Section 2 ad-
dresses the objections about the means of nudges, especially the claim that nudges undermine individual 
autonomy. The discussion identifies two main objections in this direction: the rationality objection and the 
reflection objection and discusses their problems to support that nudges are ethically problematic. Finally, the 
paper ends with some concluding remarks.
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1.  OBJECTIONS TO THE AIMS OF NUDGES
The first argument in defence of the ethical acceptability of nudges is that nudges improve people’s sub-
jective wellbeing. Thaler and Sunstein argue that nudges attempt to influence choices to ‘make the choosers 
better off as judged by themselves’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). Drawing on findings from behavioural 
economics, the authors argue that nudges improve individual wellbeing and promote choices that agents 
would choose if their decisions were not affected by cognitive biases, poor self-control and limited time, in-
formation and cognitive abilities. Given these factors, Thaler and Sunstein maintain that policymakers ought 
to interfere in people’s choices and steer them towards the options that their rational self would have chosen 
free from the influence of decision biases. The argument is vital to defending the ethical value of nudges; the 
implementation of nudges is deemed ethically legitimate because nudges promote wellbeing, and people 
agree with the direction in which they are being nudged.
1.1.  Nudges and wellbeing, as judged by individuals’ themselves?
Thaler and Sunstein claim that nudges steer individual wellbeing as judged by the individuals them-
selves. However, the general discussion around nudges indicates that this first justification is problematic. 
Critics argue that to support that nudges promote people wellbeing, Thaler and Sunstein make unfounded 
assumptions about people preferences and ignore evidence that points otherwise (Gigerenzer, 2015; Infante 
et al., 2016; Rebonato, 2013; Sugden, 2017; White, 2013). Likewise, critics argue that their use under this 
justification is problematic for several reasons.
Infante et al. (2016) and Sugden (2017) argue that Thaler and Sunstein lack subjective information about 
what people want, and adequate criteria to prove that people’s decisions systematically fail to reflect their true 
preferences. According to Infante et al. (2016), normative behavioural economics uses a preference purifica-
tion model that assumes that ‘an inner rational agent is trapped inside a psychological shell’ (Infante et al., 
2016, p. 2). When choices are inconsistent with what is expected in rational choice theory, the assumption 
is that agents have made a mistake due to decision biases. In this context, policymakers need to change 
people’s choices and reconstruct their true preferences. However, the model does not delve into the psycho-
logy of choices and only works on the assumption that people’s choices do not reflect their preferences.
According to Thaler and Sunstein, it is evident that people prefer to be fit and healthy than overweight 
and unhealthy, and it is evident that people prefer to cut senseless expenses in the interests of a wealthier 
future. However, Thaler and Sunstein fail to provide evidence that these inferred preferences reflect people’s 
true preferences. Rational preferences are assumed but are not empirically proven (Sugden, 2017, p. 117).
Sugden (2017) argues that Thaler and Sunstein do not provide satisfactory criteria to distinguish choices 
resulting from a cognitive bias from decisions motivated by alternative factors. To establish whether a deci-
sion is good or bad, Thaler and Sunstein only take its outcome into consideration: if the choice maximises 
utility, it is rational; if it does not, it is a mistake resulting from a cognitive bias. However, their approach fails 
to provide appropriate evidence that the choice is an error of judgment. In this regard, Thaler and Sunstein 
lack empirical evidence about people’s true preferences and do not have criteria to identify which choices are 
affected by cognitive biases.
Similarly, Gigerenzer (2015) also questions the evidence underpinning the fact that nudges promote 
people wellbeing. Gigerenzer (2015, 2018) argues that behavioural economics lacks empirical evidence to 
support the notion that people predictably and systematically lack rationality and remarks that decision-ma-
king mistakes due to cognitive biases are not as prevalent as Thaler and Sunstein assume. Accordingly, he 
questions the use of nudges under the justification that they promote people’s true preferences. Gigerenzer 
claims that embracing the standard justification of nudges blames people for their own mistakes while failing 
to recognise that, in general, their decisions are correct. In this sense, using nudges under the standard 
justification can lead policymakers to refrain from considering alternative strategies for behavioural change. 
Gigerenzer argues that, beyond nudges, behavioural evidence supports the use of interventions that intend 
to educate people, improve their deliberative capacities or correct external factors that may be affecting their 
decisions (Gigerenzer, 2015, 2018).
In a very confrontational critique, White (2013) also argues that behavioural economics has essential 
limitations in supporting the claim that nudges promote individual subjective wellbeing because people have 
different understandings of what is good for them. Given these limitations, White argues that nudges should 
be rejected because, under the original justification, nudges entail a value substitution that replaces agents’ 
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judgment of what is best for them, with the policymaker’s interest over what they should be doing. This is 
ethically problematic because it gives policymakers carte blanch to nudge as they please, without actually 
justifying when and why nudges promote positive goals.
In summary, critics agree that the claim that nudges promote people’s wellbeing is supported by assump-
tions about human behaviour and rationality rather than on substantial empirical evidence about individuals’ 
preferences. These arguments postulate problems for nudges ethical acceptability. Nudges appear proble-
matic because policymakers might use this claim to conceal an excessive paternalistic agenda or to promote 
illicit ends.
1.2.  Nudges, alternative aims and justifications
When discussing the problems nudges have with fulfilling their original goal, many authors have explored 
nudges’ potential to promote different aims and how their use is ethically acceptable under diverse normative 
justifications.
Carrying on with Thaler and Sunstein’s original intention, many authors have discussed nudge’s potential 
to improve people’s wellbeing, regardless of their preferences. Often there can be inconsistencies between 
what people want and what is right for them. In these situations, it is common for governments to interfere in 
people’s choices and justify this interference under paternalism. Paternalism can be defined, as ‘the interfe-
rence by some outside agent in a person’s freedom for the latter’s good’ (Le Grand & New, 2015, p. 7). This 
includes cases in which governments interfere in people’s choices to promote particular outcomes, even at 
the expense of agents’ preferences. For instance, governments require people to wear seatbelts in cars and 
helmets when riding motorcycles, prevent people from swimming or skiing in potentially harmful weather con-
ditions and ban drugs to prevent their adverse effects. In line with these interventions, nudges which seek to 
make people engage in healthy habits or save up money for the future, for instance, seem to follow a pater-
nalistic intention. Indeed, most of the examples illustrated by Thaler and Sunstein seek to help people to get 
healthier and wealthier by assuming that this is what they want; therefore, policymakers could defend their 
use under a paternalistic justification and argue that ‘nudged individuals are always better off independently 
of their preferences’ (Guala & Mittone, 2015, p. 386)
Beyond individual wellbeing, some authors have considered the advantages of using nudges to tackle 
social problems. Nudges can be useful in resolving issues where the need for intervention is already justified 
by traditional economic grounds, for instance, in cases of externalities, public goods and information asym-
metry (Chetty, 2015; Loewenstein & Chater, 2017). For instance, Guala & Mittone (2015) argue in favour of 
using nudges to solve public policy problems, particularly to correct externalities. The authors highlight that 
Thaler and Sunstein had already considered this option themselves in ‘Nudge’ when they mention the poten-
tial of nudges to promote energy conservation, organ donation and tax compliance.
Similarly, Loewenstein & Chater (2017) point out that incorporating insight on nudges into issues of pu-
blic policy can be highly beneficial when it comes to rethinking the tools available for changing behaviour in 
situations of coordination or social dilemmas. For instance, on matters concerning public goods, the traditional 
economic framework asserts that it is rational for self-interested individuals to act as free-riders. Drawing on 
these assumptions, interventions aimed at correcting this behaviour rely exclusively on incentives, bans and 
the privatisation of public goods (Guala & Mittone, 2015). Behavioural and social sciences have shown that 
there could be biased motivations underlying what economics classifies as free-rider behaviour. For instance, 
cognitive biases could be why people fail to cooperate, due to inertia, social influence or the effect of elements 
of the choice architecture. If this is the case, a nudge could be very useful in improving cooperation and redu-
cing externalities. On a similar note, Nagatsu (2015) introduces the concept of social nudges and evaluates the 
potential of nudges to improve the provision of public goods. In relation to public goods, extensive evidence in 
social science suggests that individuals are conditional co-operators rather than free-riders, meaning that they 
have preferences for cooperating if others also cooperate (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 2007). In this case, there is 
no bias; however, using a nudge that communicates the behaviour of others may activate a social norm and 
could be helpful when it comes to increasing cooperation. These examples illustrate that nudges have the 
potential to pursue different policy goals and can complement traditional policy interventions.
Using nudges to tackle any policy problem opens up the possibilities of how to legitimise their use. Com-
menting on alternative ways to justify the implementation of nudges, Kelly (2013, p. 213) maintains that the 
same techniques that Thaler and Sunstein suggest using to make individuals better off can also be utilised 
to promote utilitarian and Rawlsian goals. The use of nudges may undermine individual freedom of choice 
ARTÍCULOS 27 
Júlia de Quintana Medina
What is wrong with nudges? Addressing normative objections to the aims and the means of nudges
GAPP. Nueva Época – N.o 25, marzo 2021 – ISSN: 1989-8991 – DOI: https://doi.org/10.24965/gapp.i25.10865 – [Págs. 23-37]
Número monográfico – Los nudges y el diseño conductual de políticas públicas
and may involve paternalism; however, their use may still be legitimate if they improve overall social welfare, 
reduce inequalities or ensure access to primary goods.
In ‘Nudge’, Thaler and Sunstein outline the rationale for intervening with nudges (the existence of failures 
of rationality) and define the ethical legitimisation of nudges with libertarian paternalism (promoting individual 
subjective wellbeing). Section 1.1 has argued that the existing evidence falls short of supporting nudges ori-
ginal argument for ethical acceptability. If people have to agree with their aims for nudges to be legitimated, 
their implementation is much more restricted than Thaler and Sunstein defend. Likewise, if policymakers use 
nudges under this justification, its use is problematic and raises relevant normative objections.
However, we should not reject nudges because they fail to promote people’s subjective wellbeing. When 
discussing the aims of nudges, inevitably they are presumed to be linked to libertarian paternalism. In fact, 
both terms are often confused and used interchangeably (Gigerenzer, 2015; Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; 
Schubert, 2015). However, nudges and libertarian paternalism have distinct and separable meanings. Liber-
tarian paternalism is a normative framework that aims to promote specific values and ends; nudges are tools 
to influence behaviour and encourage behavioural change. Nudges should be understood as a policy tool, a 
tool with practical value for promoting pro-self and pro-social goals, the implementation of which can respond 
to different normative justifications.
White (2013, p. 83) argues that nudging is not about helping people make better choices, but about get-
ting people to make the choices that ‘policymakers want them to make’. The point is that this is not necessa-
rily a problem, particularly if nudges promote ethically consistent goals. It is clear that resolving current public 
policy problems requires a change in people’s behaviour, and that traditional government tools sometimes 
fail to tackle such issues. Nudges working complementarily with other tools can shape individual behaviour 
to match different objectives and motivate behavioural change. As far as their aims are concerned, nudges 
are not inherently problematic.
2.  OBJECTIONS TO THE MEANS OF NUDGES
The second argument in defence of nudges’ ethical acceptability is the claim that nudges respect agents’ 
freedom of choice. Thaler and Sunstein argue that, in general, people should be free to choose what they 
want to do according to their preferences. For this reason, libertarian paternalism attempts to design policies 
‘that maintain or increase freedom of choice’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5).
Nonetheless, several authors note that the fact that nudges do not enforce explicit barriers to liberty is 
insufficient to address their ethical implications. The majority of critics agree that even though nudges do not 
block choices, do not modify economic incentives and typically maintain all the available options in a context 
of choice, they interfere in people’s decision-making and diminish their ability to make their own choices. Many 
found nudges problematic due to how they steer people’s behaviour; specifically, they express concerns about 
nudges’ effect on individual autonomy (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Hausman & Welch, 2010; Kelly, 2013).
The debate on nudges and autonomy is tricky because it includes different and sometimes contradictory 
understanding of autonomy as well as normative and descriptive ideas about how individual preferences are 
formed and should be formed, which factors affect and should affect decision-making, and which elements 
promote or undermine personal autonomy. Despite the many worries and different conceptualisations of au-
tonomy and decision-making discussed within nudge literature, objections that find nudges problematic due 
to how they steer choices tend to focus on two ideas:
a) Nudges are problematic because they trigger non-rational psychological mechanisms.
b) Nudges are problematic because they impede or obstruct reflection.
Some critics note that nudges threaten autonomy because they work via irrational mechanisms and 
take advantage of people’s cognitive flaws (Bovens, 2009; Conly, 2012; Hausman, 2018; Hausman & Welch, 
2010; White, 2013). Many authors indicate that working through non-rational mechanisms compromises 
people’s autonomy. Other authors suggest that nudges typically work covertly without decision-makers being 
aware of the nudge and by bypassing or obscuring deliberation (Bovens, 2009; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 
2016), leading to these factors undermining reflectiveness and compromising people’s autonomy. In this first 
theme, the focus is on rational deliberation, and the fear is that nudges trigger non-rational psychological 
mechanisms. I use the expression “the rationality objection” to represent these worries and objections. The 
second theme focuses on reflection and conscious deliberation, and nudges appear problematic because 
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they impede or obstruct it. I use the expression “the reflection objection” to refer to these objections. There is 
a significant overlap between the arguments; however, differentiating the cases seems to be the best way to 
address which elements of nudges are problematic.
Below, I discuss these two objections. I analyse why nudges appear problematic, and under which argu-
ments and assumptions those objections hold true. Firstly, I note that in both cases, critics tend to misrepresent 
nudges. Critics often group nudge interventions into the same category, relying on elements that are difficult 
to conceptualise and not shared by all nudges. As a result, they assess them as a general category and fail 
to consider the differences between nudges. Secondly, I argue that idealistic understandings of decision-ma-
king and autonomy underpin both objections. Critics employ conceptions of rationality and reflection that lack 
psychological insights and rely on assumptions unsupported by the empirical evidence on decision-making.
2.1.  The rationality objection
The rationality objection states that nudges are problematic because they trigger or take advantage of 
irrational psychological mechanisms. Hausman and Welch (2010, p. 130) argue that nudges play on ‘flaws 
in human judgment and decision-making to shape people’s choices’. Similarly, Bovens (2009, p. 209) ar-
gues that what distinguishes nudges from other types of influences in shaping choices is the fact that ‘some 
pattern of irrationality is being exploited’. On the same note, Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2016, p. 153) state 
that ‘what is genuinely novel about the nudging approach […] is the idea of exploiting people’s cognitive and 
motivational deficiencies’. Conly (2012, p. 30) also remarks that, when nudging, ‘rather than regarding people 
as generally capable of making good choices, we outmanoeuvre them by appealing to their irrationality, just 
in more fruitful ways’.
In general, authors agree with the fact that influencing choices by triggering irrational responses is ethi-
cally problematic. According to Hausman and Welch (2010, p. 128), when shaping choices ‘does not take the 
form of rational persuasion, autonomy–the extent to which individuals have control over their own evaluation 
and deliberation–is diminished’. On a similar note, Bovens (2009, p. 209) points out that ‘there is something 
less than fully autonomous about the patterns of decision-making that Nudge taps into’ and argues that ‘when 
we are subject to the mechanisms that are studied in “the science of choice”, then we are not fully in control 
of our actions’.
The above citations suggest that the problem with nudges is the fact that they exploit irrationality. For 
example, framing devices that highlight losses appear harmful because they affect behaviour by exploiting 
loss aversion and, therefore, change behaviour by exploiting an irrational bias without involving rational re-
asons. Similarly, default rules appear to be problematic because they do not constitute a rational reason to 
change preferences over options (Bovens, 2009). Likewise, the communication of social norms works be-
cause it triggers an irrational response and is problematic because agents do not make choices based on a 
rational consideration (Bovens, 2009; Hausman & Welc, 2010; Schubert, 2015). In the rationality objection, 
the essential idea is that exploiting irrationality compromises people’s autonomy.
The objection to nudges on the basis that they exploit irrationality suffers from two main problems. 
Firstly, not all nudges exploit irrationality and stipulating which interventions do and which do not appears to 
be somewhat challenging. Secondly, to argue that nudges exploit irrationality and exploiting irrationality com-
promises people autonomy critics rely on rational choice theory as the normative foundation of behaviour, a 
framework with notorious problems.
2.1.1.  Nudges and rationality
Let us start by considering the relationship between nudges and rationality. The most common answer 
for defending nudges against the rationality objection is to argue that not all nudges exploit irrationality. 
Sunstein (2015b), for instance, responds to critics by claiming that many nudges, such as, education cam-
paigns, informational campaigns, reminders, warnings and the provision of feedback are interventions that 
engage rational deliberation and do not constitute a threat to people’s rationality 1. Sunstein employs a broad 
1 There is a problem of conceptualisation within this debate. It is difficult to articulate whether these interventions should count as 
nudges because there are no precise definitions of a nudge. The border between which interventions are nudges and which interventions 
are not is diffuse. Several interventions count as nudges because they do not change economic incentives and do not ban or exclude any 
option; however, it is unclear how they relate with rationality and decision-making biases and whether they should be considered nudges.
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definition, which fits many different types of interventions that do respect rational deliberation. If one adopts 
his definition, then indeed many nudges respect rationality. However, even if we adopt Sunstein’s approach, 
the fact that some so-called “nudges” can be considered generally unproblematic does not resolve concerns 
about those interventions that work by exploiting cognitive flaws. In recent publications, critics seem to direct 
the rationality objection only at those interventions that rely on people’s cognitive biases. For instance, Haus-
man (2018, p. 18) uses the term “nudging” to reference ‘changing the choice circumstance to neutralise or to 
exploit deliberative foibles’ and explicitly distinguishes nudges from other ways of steering choices such as 
information, education or deceiving. However, even when more refined, it is challenging to articulate which 
decision-making factors neutralise or exploit irrational biases.
In ‘Nudge’ Thaler & Sunstein (2008, p. 37) stress the idea that human behaviour is “nudgeable”, which 
means it can be easily influenced through mechanisms not considered within the traditional economics fra-
mework. The authors mention different factors and classify them into three groups: biases and blunders, 
temptation, and following the herd (Mongin & Cozic, 2018; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
Broadly, by biases and blunders they refer to the influence of heuristics such as representativeness, 
anchoring and adjustment, and availability; and biases such as overconfidence, loss aversion, and framing 
effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). By temptation, they refer to a lack of 
will power and general failures to control impulses and maintain self-control. By following the herd, they 
emphasise the significance of social influence and social norms in shaping agents’ decision-making. Within 
behavioural economics, these factors are conceived as deviations from rational choice and regarded as 
non-rational. As a result, designing choice architecture in ways that engage with these psychological factors 
implies that people’s choices are affected by irrational factors. However, whether these factors are irrational 
is not a straightforward point. The factors described in ‘Nudge’ as decision-making flaws do not hold true if 
interpreted according to alternative understandings of rationality (Gigerenzer, 2015; Schubert, 2015; Mongin 
& Cozic, 2018).
Firstly, the biases and blunders category refers to factors such as framing effects, loss aversion and 
other psychological biases found under the heuristics and biases research programme. Within behavioural 
economics, framing effects and loss aversion are presented as typical examples of decision-making biases. 
They occur when an agent’s preferences between two identical sets of alternatives vary depending on how 
options are described, particularly if they are described as losses rather than gains. These findings violate 
the axioms of the expected utility model and are accordingly classified as biases. However, adopting an alter-
native approach, Gigerenzer (2008) maintains that, in cases where two definitions of the same situation are 
framed, they are logically equivalent but not informationally equal. Given contextual and cognitive constraints, 
agents use fast and frugal heuristics for breaking down pertinent information and decide between options. In 
these situations, decisions shaped by framings effects are not irrational but ecologically rational, i.e., rational 
in a particular context. The fast and frugal research programme generally challenges the findings of the heu-
ristics and biases research programme. Research on ecological rationality establishes that many supposed 
irrational biases are “ecologically rational” across environments, given conditions of uncertainty and limited 
cognitive resources.
The temptation category refers to issues of self-control, failures to resist temptation and time inconsis-
tency. According to different conceptions of rationality, these factors often qualify as failures of rationality. 
Decision-making research on temporal choice has verified a systematic preference for small but imminent 
rewards over greater but delayed rewards. Agents discount future utility, a phenomenon labelled as tempo-
ral discounting. In behavioural economics, research on temporal choices follows the hyperbolic discounting 
model, a model that asserts that when agents face a choice between an inferior early option and a superior 
later option, they prefer the latter when both options are remote in time but switch to preferring the former 
as the time for both options approaches. The change of preferences appears irrational because agents’ pre-
ferences are not consistent over time (Laibson, 1997). However, rational factors could also explain choice 
inconsistency and preference reversal. Inconsistent changes in preferences over time can result from im-
perfect foresight, lack of information, or recently learned information, factors that might induce individuals to 
change or update their preferences. Therefore, while inconsistent time preferences often reflect irrationality, it 
is empirically difficult to identify in which situations this is the case and to distinguish these cases from rational 
cases of preference reversal.
In terms of following the herd, decision-making research provides extensive evidence as to why following 
a social norm or following the behaviour of others is unlikely to be irrational. According to broader notions 
of rational choice theory that question the assumption of unbounded self-interest, game theory research 
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suggests that as far as public goods are concerned, individuals have conditional preferences for conformity 
meaning that they prefer cooperation if a sufficient number of others also cooperate (Bicchieri, 2006; Elster, 
2007). Nagatsu (2015) maintains that nudges that provide information about the behaviour of the majority 
mobilise these preferences and trigger a rational response. Gigerenzer (2015) also contends that observing 
and following other’s behaviour in the context of uncertainty and limited information is following a social 
heuristic, which is an “ecologically rational” strategy. Likewise, Hedström (2006) argues that observing and 
copying other behaviours in cases of limited information is a rational strategy, a mechanism usually called 
“rational imitation”.
The examples described highlight alternative interpretations of the same phenomena as rational or irra-
tional, depending on the understanding of rationality employed 2. Some nudges are designed to engage with 
psychological mechanisms traditionally regarded as non-rational within economics. As a result, conceptua-
lising nudges as interventions that exploit irrationality requires accepting the rational choice model as the 
normative model of behaviour and distinguishing good (rational) influences from bad (non-rational) ones. 
However, there is considerable disagreement about identifying rational and non-rational factors and contro-
versy about which nudges trigger rational or non-rational mechanisms. The objection to rationality already 
excludes nudges that most resemble rational persuasion, such as reminders, warnings, some types of infor-
mation and some types of educational campaigns. However, doubts about how nudges relate to rationality 
are also relevant for interventions that exploit cognitive weaknesses and are typically classified as nudges.
2.1.2.  Rationality and autonomy
Let us now consider why exploiting irrational factors is problematic in terms of autonomy. Critics identify 
nudges as negative influences because they do not engage rationality. Rationality appears to be the crucial 
element of autonomous choice within this approach; individuals are expected to engage in rational thinking, 
process all the relevant information and act according to their consistent preferences. However, empirical 
evidence on decision-making indicates that this approach relies on a somewhat idealistic and heroic view of 
rationality and decision-making, which does not match reality.
Rational choice theory is a substantive theory of rationality (Simon, 1997). It uses a specific set of axioms 
to study and model behaviour and employs assumptions about agents’ internal decision-making processes, 
namely perfect rationality, perfect foresight, consistent preferences and unlimited computation abilities. The 
expected utility model works with these axioms and explains and predicts behaviour as if subjects behave 
accordingly. Rational choice theory serves as a theory for modelling behaviour but does not account for the 
actual process of decision-making. It does not delve deeper into the decision-making process and does not 
explore the truthfulness of axioms.
While a substantive theory of rationality can be useful in decision-making research, particularly when 
constructing models and predicting behaviour, when the same conception is used to inform the ethical debate 
on autonomy, it is much more problematical. The rational choice theory model faces significant criticism both 
in descriptive and normative terms. Extensive experimental findings question its descriptive power (e.g. Ang-
ner & Loewenstein, 2007; DellaVigna, 2009), and the framework attracts significant criticism when used as a 
normative theory of decision-making (Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Gigerenzer, 2015). A conception of autonomy 
as rationality based on a model that does not accurately describe agents’ decision-making and is notorious 
for its detractors is not suitable for judging nudges’ moral acceptability.
Those committed to the standard model of rationality may still argue that nudges are problematic. They 
may argue that, ideally, people should be rationally persuaded, and that governments and policy institutions 
should prioritise the use of interventions that influence behaviour via rational reasons such as education, 
information, monetary incentives and coercive measures. However, committing to rational choice has some 
limitations.
Firstly, non-rational factors will always affect behaviour. Most actions are affected by a multiplicity of mo-
tives; some of these motives qualify as rational, others not. We cannot expect people to only act for rational 
reasons; non-rational reasons play an equal part in and are relevant to decision-making. Even in the absence 
2 In some cases, it is not even a different concept of rationality, but using rational choice theory, with some informational as-
sumptions, to explain the phenomenon. For example, following the behaviour of others can be explained with the rational imitation 
mechanism, in which, in contexts of limited information, what others are doing signals the rational (or utility maximation) course of action 
(Hedström, 2006).
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of nudges, non-rational factors usually affect choices, so it is unclear why these factors should be considered 
unsuitable for use in changing decisions. Secondly, nudges do not intend to replace other strategies, and 
their use is compatible with trying to change people behaviour by using rational strategies. Likewise, in some 
cases, nudges may have some comparative advantages over other alternatives. For instance, education 
campaigns have limitations to tackle some issues, are more expensive and do not always induce behavioural 
change in the short term (Conly, 2012; Datta and Mullainathan, 2014) The use of more coercive strategies 
such as regulations and sanctions can backfire due to crowding out non-egocentric deliberation and intrin-
sically motivated compliance (Pettit, 1996). Similarly, the provision of monetary incentives provides extrinsic 
motivations for doing certain behaviours; and in some contexts, monetary incentives tend to discourage those 
that were naturally drawn to comply and frame a situation as a monetary issue which legitimises free-rider be-
haviour and can reduce the chances of peer punishment for non-compliance (Gneezy et al., 2011). In these 
cases, using nudges might be beneficial to surpass these limitations.
The rationality objection essentially argues that nudges do not respect rational decision-making and 
undermine people’s autonomy. These objections only hold true under assumptions on behaviour based on 
the rational choice model. According to the model, individuals ought to behave and actually do behave ratio-
nally; thus, nudges that exploit irrationality compromise their autonomy. However, when one acknowledges 
the limitations of rational choice theory and considers alternative understandings of rationality, the rationality 
objection loses strength (Schmidt, 2019). Firstly, arguing that nudges trigger irrational mechanisms is not a 
clear-cut empirical distinction but a normative one that requires a normative assessment of decision-making 
factors according to the rational choice theory framework. Secondly, the account of autonomy as rationality 
is too idealistic and normatively charged, and empirical research emphasises that it is based on unrealistic 
assumptions (Felsen & Reiner, 2015; Mills, 2015; Schubert, 2015; Schmidt, 2019). 
2.2.  The reflection objection
The reflection objection states that nudges are harmful and compromise individuals’ autonomy because 
they actively reduce agents’ engagement in the decision-making process. Reflection means that agents are 
aware of the factors that influence their choices, engage with these factors and exert some sort of effort and 
deliberation into decision-making. Some authors stress that nudges are unnoticeable, work unconsciously 
and steer people towards a specific choice with limited consciousness and limited effort. As a result, critics 
argue that nudges compromise people’s reflectiveness.
Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs (2012), state that nudges can imply manipulation when they are diffi-
cult to perceive:
‘Manipulation occurs when one influences another by bypassing their capacity for reason, either 
by exploiting nonrational elements of psychological makeup or by influencing choices in a way 
that is not obvious to the subject’ (p. 5)
Bovens (2009) notes that nudges tend to be hard to perceived and work best when unnoticeable:
‘The psychological mechanisms that are exploited in Cafeteria and in Save More tomorrow 3 
typically work better in the dark. If we tell students that the order of the food in the Cafeteria is 
rearranged for dietary purposes, then the intervention may be less successful’ (p. 3)
Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2016) state that nudges can produce an automatic response without agents’ 
active attention:
‘in a nudge, the policymaker does not rely on the agent’s ability to stop or override a targeted be-
havior or cognition. Instead, the nudge intervention can ‘remedy’ an individual’s actions without 
the individual making an active contribution. It is this feature that leads critics to argue that nud-
ges are manipulative and that they violate autonomy and dignity’ (p. 176)
Baldwin (2014) states that some nudges compromise autonomy because they work without awareness 
and reflection:
3 The cafeteria nudge references the reorganisation of the food chain in a Cafeteria in a way that makes healthy options easier 
and more convenient to select. The Save More tomorrow references a programme that increases pension contributions with each pay 
raise by default (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
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‘the targeted individual’s behavioural or volitional limitations and ‘automatic’ responses will in 
practice lead him or her to accept the nudge with limited awareness and reflection.’(p. 836)
These quotes express worries about nudges impeding reflectiveness 4. In contrast to the examples dis-
cussed in the last section, it is easy to appreciate the difference with worries on rationality. For instance, 
nudging by using framing effects is an intrusion on autonomy because agents cannot identify that there is 
an intervention aimed at shaping their behaviour and fail to recognise how the frame affected their decision. 
Baldwin (2014) argues that framing devices can shape behaviour ‘in a manner that is resistant to unpacking 
in so far as assessing the nature and extent of the nudge is not readily achieved by refection’ (p. 836). In this 
case, the worry is not about rationality but reflectiveness. Similarly, defaults appear problematic because they 
can work without individuals perceiving the intervention or its effect. Therefore, defaults undermine autonomy, 
not because they exploit a cognitive bias, but due to their potential to influence choices without awareness 
and reflection (Smith, Goldstein, and Johnson 2013). By contrast, the communication of social norms is a 
nudge that does not appear as problematic because it engages reflection: agents can identify the nudge, 
and it works through a process that involves some degree of reflection (Bovens, 2009; Hansen & Jespersen, 
2013). As a result, even though communicating social norms might activate a non-rational response, it is a 
less problematic nudge because it engages reflectiveness.
The key aspects of concern regarding the reflection objection are: (a) nudges bypass deliberation and 
affect behaviour unconsciously, and (b) nudges lack transparency and have to operate unnoticeably to work. 
These two features raise concerns about nudges pushing people into doing things without reflectiveness, 
thereby undermining their autonomy. However, the reflection objection has two main problems, just as the 
rationality objection does. Firstly, it is unclear which nudges bypass deliberation, and are unnoticeable. Se-
condly, it considers reflectiveness to be a crucial component of autonomous choice, a notion which appears 
to be too idealistic when the psychological evidence is taken into account. I shall start by commenting on the 
first issue, and then return to the discussion on reflectiveness, decision-making and autonomy.
2.2.1.  Diversity of nudges and ethical implications
With regard to nudges impeding people’s reflectiveness, there appears to be a consensus on the fea-
tures that make nudges problematic: (a) they bypass deliberation (b) they are not transparent. While both 
claims are frequent in nudge literature, many authors also acknowledge that not all nudges have these fea-
tures. Sunstein points this out by emphasising ‘the importance of having a sufficiently capacious sense of the 
category of nudges, and an appreciation of the differences among them’ (Sunstein 2015a, p. 513) and uses 
this argument to defend nudges against objections. In line with his argument, many authors have paid more 
attention to the fact that conclusions about the moral acceptability of nudges should focus more on each 
nudge’s specific features.
Current literature offers different classifications of nudge interventions. The most well-received and com-
monly used classification of nudges is the differentiation between System 1 and System 2 nudges. The dis-
tinction follows Kahneman’s (2011) account of the dual-process cognitive theory, which describes two distinct 
systems underlying human reasoning: System 1 and System 2. System 1 is fast, automatic, uncontrolled, 
and unconscious. System 2 is slow, conscious, reflective, and controlled (Kahneman, 2011). When applied 
4 The worries on reflection underpin worries on manipulation, transparency, and dignity. I will not address these objections speci-
fically because I suggest that they boil down to worries about nudges’ effect on reflectiveness. For instance, the account of manipulation 
used in nudge literature always references nudges working unconsciously and ‘in the dark’, i.e., working without the full attention and 
awareness of agents. Because the influence operates in the dark, the nudge is non-transparent and implies manipulation. However, 
manipulation can be understood in different ways and can take different forms. Firstly, manipulation implies that A has to pressure B to 
do something that B does not want to do. In the case of nudges, while we cannot argue that people always want to be nudged towards 
an outcome, we cannot say that they oppose it. Likewise, manipulation can happen transparently, by shaping arguments, exploiting emo-
tions and deceiving people. In these forms, manipulation does not operate ‘in the dark’ and has nothing to do with whether agents notice 
an intervention’s effect or influence (Wilkinson, 2013). In nudge literature, claims of manipulation and transparency relate to the degree 
of reflectiveness that agents have in decision-making; thus, it is better to address these objections by examining the effects of nudges on 
reflectiveness. Similarly, objections related to dignity and individual responsibility also reflect concerns about how nudges affect reflecti-
veness. Detractors of nudges maintain that nudges do not help us to learn to make better choices in the future, because they override our 
conscious reasoning and block the learning process (White, 2013, p. 102). This leads some to worry that nudging infantilises individuals 
and undermines their responsibility and dignity (Bovens, 2009; Gigerenzer, 2015; White, 2013). Again, these objections raise concerns 
about how nudges shape choices, and how much reflection they engage; therefore, to allay such worries, it would be better to address 
them by discussing the effects of nudges on reflectiveness.
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to nudges, the schema distinguishes between System 1 and System 2 nudges. System 1 nudges tend to be 
described as unconscious, non-deliberative influences that override human agency. System 2 nudges are 
described as reflective triggering influences that engage agency. The two types are also referred to as non-
educational and educational nudges respectively (e.g. Hertwig and Ryall 2016; Sunstein, 2017). Examples 
of System 1 nudges include the use of defaults and the design of physical options in the decision-making 
environment. Examples of System 2 nudges include disclosing information or using educational campaigns. 
System 2 nudges implicitly tend to be seen as good nudges while System 1 nudges appear to be more mo-
rally problematic.
The distinction between System 1 and System 2 serves as a good schema to argue against objections 
that present nudges as interventions that always bypass deliberation, tend to prompt an unconscious or unre-
flective response and are usually unnoticed. The distinction has been adopted by proponents of nudges and 
is regularly employed to differentiate between nudge interventions and address their ethical implications. The 
distinction can be found in research on the empirical performance and effectiveness of nudge interventions 
(e.g. Hollands et al. 2013; Smith, Goldstein and Johnson 2013) and in reserch on attitudes towards nudges to 
study whether people accept nudges and how they judge different nudge interventions (e.g. Felsen, Castelo, 
and Reiner, 2013; Hagman et al. 2015; Jung and Mellers 2016; Sunstein, 2017).The classification is still pre-
liminary and requires further research on the psychological mechanisms behind different nudges. However, 
it is a good starting point to distinguish how different nudges affect behaviour and what this implies in terms 
of moral implications.
Alternatively, other authors have also presented classifications to discuss the moral implications of di-
fferent nudges. For instance, Baldwin (2014) develops a taxonomy of nudge interventions that classifies 
nudges in three degrees: First Degree, Second Degree and Third Degree nudges, depending on how an 
intervention engages autonomy. Baldwin operationalises autonomy as the way in which nudges take reflec-
tive decision-making into account (Baldwin, 2014, p. 835). Similarly, Saghai (2013) distinguishes between 
interventions that entirely or partly bypassed deliberation. He argues that it is often assumed that nudges 
trigger an automatic cognitive process, however, this is not always the case. On a similar note, Hansen & 
Jespersen (2013) present an epistemic distinction of nudges according to how different nudges engage de-
liberation and whether the interventions are transparent. With regard to deliberation, they classify nudges as 
Type 1 and Type 2. The aim of Type 1 nudges is to change behaviour without involving reflective thinking, 
while Type 2 nudges involve reflective thinking, and mainly influence behaviour resulting from some degree 
of deliberation. With regard to transparency, they define a transparent nudge as a ‘nudge provided in such a 
way that the intention behind it, as well as the means by which behavioural change is pursued, could reaso-
nably be expected to be transparent to the agent being nudged’ (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 17). In their 
classification, both Type 1 and Type 2, nudges can be transparent and un-transparent. In their framework, 
Type 1– non-transparent are seen as more ethically problematic. Finally, Bovens (2009) also explores the 
differences between nudges in terms of transparency and suggest that nudges that are not directly evident to 
the subjects are more morally problematic.
The available classifications differ in the criteria they use and how they classify nudge interventions. 
However, they all agree that nudges operate differently and that considering these differences is crucial to 
assess their ethical acceptability. Further research on how nudges affect behaviour is needed to identify tho-
se nudges that impede reflectiveness and can be ethically problematic.
2.2.2.  Reflectiveness and autonomy
The reflection objection establishes that nudges are harmful because they impede reflection by bypas-
sing or obstructing deliberation and working in a manner that is not transparent and cannot be identified by 
subjects. Critics emphasise that agents should be conscious of the factors that affect their choices and enga-
ge in some reflection to produce a choice and therefore contend that nudges compromise people’s autonomy. 
However, the conception of autonomy as reflectiveness holds high standards about how decision-making 
ought to be and overlooks issues arising from the context of choice that might affect the decision-making pro-
cess and undermine people’s autonomy. Different responses to the worries present in the reflection objection 
indicate that focusing only on how nudges affect the decision-making process is limited to assess their ethical 
implications on autonomy.
Research suggests that the vast majority of our choices are affected by unconscious influences (Felsen & 
Reiner, 2015; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2008). In general, we act upon many factors 
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that we do not perceive, and we are rarely fully aware of all the factors that affect our decisions (Conly, 2012; Fel-
sen, Castelo, & Reiner, 2013). Therefore, it is unclear why unconscious and covert influences should be labelled 
as being problematic. At the same time, even if we are unaware of the intervention or relevant psychological me-
chanisms that bring about a particular choice, we are usually aware of the choices we make and we can reflect on 
them (Uhlmann et al., 2008). So, even if non-conscious and covert factors affect our decision, in a vast majority 
of contexts ‘we still consider ourselves as the authors of these choices, post hoc’ (Nagatsu, 2015, p. 489).
A conception of autonomy formulated primarily based on the fact that people have to be overtly influenced 
and aware of the factors that affect their choices is inconsistent with empirical evidence on decision-making 
(Felsen & Reiner, 2011, 2015). Many factors that affect agents’ choices are not directly evident to them and in-
fluence their behaviour unconsciously. At the same time, the fact that some nudges might influence behaviour 
covertly is far from meaning that agents will be completely unaware of their resulting behaviour or choice. They 
may be unaware of the nudge, or the mechanism, but they are unlikely to be unaware of their own behaviour.
Several authors note that, when assessing nudges’ ethical value, critics make implicit assumptions about 
how agents’ reasons and motivations come about, particularly about how internal and external factors influen-
ce their choices. The requirement that agents have to be aware of the factors that affect their decisions is 
associated with the idea that there are “pure” reasons that guide people’s decisions. Implicitly, critics rely on 
an ideal notion that assumes that there are “authentic” internal causes for action that should be respected and 
preserved to guide individual decisions (Felsen & Reiner, 2015; Fischer & Lotz, 2014; Schubert, 2015). De-
tractors of nudges seem to presuppose that internal causes are defined, stable and perfectly distinguishable 
from external influences; consequently, nudges are external, intentional influences that disturb pure internal 
reasons and, therefore, undermine people’s autonomy.
By contrast, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue that choices are always affected by the disposition of op-
tions in the context of choice as a fundamental argument in defending nudges’ acceptability. The authors claim 
that the effect that choice architecture has on behaviour is inevitable, in the sense that individuals’ decisions will 
be affected by other arbitrary factors beyond their control in the absence of nudges. Building on this argument, 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) emphasise that opposing nudges is nonsensical, because people are always being 
nudged, by which they mean always being influenced by non-controlled factors in the choice architecture.
Similarly, Schubert (2015, p. 8) argues that, ‘when debating the ethics of nudging, we should stop ideali-
sing the institutional status quo’. People’s decisions are highly shaped by their context of choice. In the abs-
ence of nudges, subjects’ actions are not guided by “pure” and “authentic” reasons but by reasons that reflect 
the influence of external and internal factors and constraints (Schmidt & Engelen, 2020).
Detractors of nudges point out that the inevitability of choice architecture is not sufficient to grant nudges 
free licence; a non-intentional, random influence does not have the same implications as a deliberate interven-
tion aimed at steering people’s behaviour towards a specific end. Covert influences cannot be applied acritically 
just because other non-intentional covert influences generally affect behaviour. The intention and rationale of 
the intervention have to be discussed if an administration is planning on using nudges. However, confirming the 
fact that many non-conscious and non-transparent factors affect choices relaxes objections to reflectiveness.
People’s choices, values and actions are not the consequence of deliberation based on purely internal 
motives, but rather the result of a combination of internal and external factors. The notion of autonomy of 
reflectiveness loses significance in light of the evidence that individuals adjust their preferences and aspira-
tions to their possibilities (Elster, 1983), that the context of choice heavily influences people’s behaviour and 
the confirmation that many processes, whether conscious, unconscious, intentional or non-intentional, affect 
individual desires and choices.
Several philosophical notions of autonomy emphasise that individuals have to be able to make the choi-
ces they want to make in order to be autonomous and that these choices should reflect their true preferences 
and be authentic and consistent with their ‘higher-order desires’ (Bovens, 2009; Dworkin, 1988; Felsen & Rei-
ner, 2011). The arguments under the reflection objection stress that nudges compromise autonomy because 
they corrupt the formation of preferences and desires, and people’s choices no longer reflect their authentic 
preferences. However, these objections place too much emphasis on the process of making choices and 
overlook how much people’s choices are shaped by the context and how many factors beyond the agents’ 
control tend to influence their decisions.
Building on the findings that emphasise the effect that the context of choice has on shaping choices, and 
the fact that agents struggle to control the factors that affect their behaviour, there is growing recognition of 
the fact that autonomy requires a combination of internal and external conditions (Mills, 2013, 2015). Propo-
nents of nudges defend that nudges can work as external, intentional sources of influence that will ensure a 
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better relationship with internal influences, leading to an increase in personal autonomy. For instance, nudges 
that aim to close the intention-action gap (i.e., the gap between what people intend to do and what they do) 
are nudges that promote people’s best interest in line with their second-order desires. Likewise, in cases of 
choice overload (i.e., situations in which individuals face too many options and struggle to process the infor-
mation), agents feel overwhelmed and tend to avoid choosing; consequently, a nudge might act as a choice 
enabler. In contexts in which people lack feedback or in situations in which there is a gap between the causes 
and consequences of actions, nudges might be helpful in closing this gap. Likewise, in situations involving a 
high degree of difficulty or complexity, nudges could be used to promote informed choices or facilitate choice.
Conceptions of autonomy that stress that autonomous decisions should be consistent with higher-order 
desires (e.g., Dworkin, 1988), balance a trade-off between letting people reflect on their own choices and 
helping them achieve outcomes in line with their higher-order desires. There is tension between respecting 
people’s reflectiveness and promoting positive outcomes that align with their preferences to promote their 
autonomy. Excessive attention to how nudges affect decision-making might detract from the fact that they can 
also work to promote autonomy.
In conclusion, the arguments under the reflection objection express valid doubts about how nudges 
affect the decision-making process and in which ways nudges can compromise people’s autonomy. However, 
nudges cannot generally be rejected on the bases that they undermine reflectiveness. Firstly, nudges differ 
in how they affect choices, and the assessment of their ethical implications should pay more attention to how 
different nudges operate. Secondly, the notion of autonomy as reflectiveness is too idealistic. By emphasising 
that agents need to be aware of nudges, critics implicitly assume that people make decisions based on purely 
internal reasons. However, given the effect that choice architecture has on people’s choices, this does not 
make conceptual sense. Likewise, the objections on reflection put too much emphasis on how nudges affect 
the decision-making process and tend to overlook how retaining reflectiveness might be counterproductive 
to autonomy and agents’ overall welfare. Concerns on reflection are important, but they are not sufficient to 
discard the use of nudges in policymaking.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The normative implications of nudges have been largely debated in the past decade. Objections to their 
use have been prominent and have led to various conclusions on their ethical acceptability as tools to change 
behaviour. This paper has attempted to argue that, while the current literature generally highlights that nud-
ges have an intrinsically problematic normative nature, this is not the case.
As public policy tools, it is a mistake to assume that nudges are only feasible within the libertarian pater-
nalism framework. In that respect, the paper emphasises the need to discuss alternative justifications for their 
implementation, to think about how nudges can contribute to better public policy performance by comple-
menting other policy tools and promoting already relevant policy goals. Policymakers should be clear about 
the rationale and intention behind applying nudges, but these can vary and so can their ethical acceptability.
Beyond the legitimacy of their objectives, some claim that nudges are objectionable because of the ways 
in which they change behaviour infringe autonomy. The paper has grouped the central claims against the 
means of nudges into two categories: the rationality objection and the reflection objection to address these 
concerns. In response to the two complaints, the paper defends that objectors tend to rely on a generalise 
and misrepresented idea of nudges and on unrealistic understandings of autonomy not supported on empiri-
cal bases. Revising the nature of nudges and adopting empirical-based notions of decision-making highlights 
limitations of both objections to sustain that nudges infringe autonomy.
Several questions on the ethics of nudges remain to be answered. The use of nudges in public policy 
requires a discussion on whether and how to nudge, this is, which aims nudges should promote, how different 
nudges work and affect decisions-making and in which contexts their use is normatively acceptable. Howe-
ver, this discussion should not start from a misleading conception of nudges as essentially problematic from 
an ethical point of view.
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